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Abstract 
Compared to Western European countries, the new democracies of East Central Europe (ECE) demonstrate 
substantially lower levels of institutional trust. Some authors consider this phenomenon as a consequence of 
the transition process and raise concerns about the public approval and legitimacy of ECE political systems 
and institutions. Based on the datasets of the European Social Survey (ESS), in this paper we aim to 
address this issue by shedding light on the possible differences between old and new European democracies 
regarding the origins and patterns of institutional trust. We especially focus on the micro-level foundations of 
institutional trust and through a quantitative analysis of the 2010 ESS dataset we find that, overall, similarly to 
Western Europe, institutional trust in ECE is positively associated with success in social and economic life. 
We also find that relative to westerners, ECE citizens demonstrate comparable degrees of “materialistic trust” 
as income levels and trust in institutions are similarly associated with each other across these countries even 
after controlling for several socio-economic characteristics. In addition, the citizens of new European 
democracies seem to be equally ready to formulate separate evaluative attitudes towards specific 
institutions. Our findings suggest that in order to explain the persistently low levels of trust in ECE a greater 
emphasis should be devoted to how people perceive institutional performance when they formulate their trust 
judgements towards specific institutions. 
 
Keywords: institutional trust, Eastern and Central Europe, European Social Survey, comparative research. 
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1. Introduction 
Trust is a complex psychological and social phenomenon: it implies confidence that people or institutions 
are likely to behave in an expected way [Rose-Ackerman 2001a].  Due to its intriguing nature and alleged 
importance, trust has gained considerable significance as a research topic in social sciences. As Peter 
Uslaner put it: “(t)rust brings good things and we should care about it” [Uslaner 2000:581]. The literature 
distinguishes two main dimensions of trust [Zmerli and Newton 2008]. Social (or interpersonal) trust refers 
to confidence of people towards other people1, while institutional trust is trust placed in public institutions. 
Our paper focuses on the latter, institutional dimension of trust and seeks to analyse and compare its 
patterns in East Central and Western Europe. 
The foundations of institutional trust have long been the target of inquiry for social scientists. First, 
institutional trust as public trust in the government and in politicians is related to the concept of legitimacy 
[Beetham 1991]. Since political legitimacy is a prerequisite of democratic politics, the level of public trust in 
political institutions is a highly important issue in democratic systems. Democratic governments are limited 
in exercising coercion over their own citizens and for this reason they are bound to co-operate with them. At 
the same time, higher levels of public trust in the political system involves greater likelihood of civic 
cooperation [Tyler 2011], which may also positively influence the effectiveness of political institutions. For 
instance, if people are confident that the laws serve the common good and that the judicial system is both 
effective and fair, then they are more inclined to obey the law [Tyler 1990; Tyler 2011]. Higher levels of 
institutional trust are also associated with greater compliance with governmental policies and regulations 
[Hetherington 2005; Lieberman 2007; Scholz 1998; Weatherford 1992]. In short, higher institutional trust 
may contribute to more effective institutional performance and easier policy implementation [Tyler 2006]. 
There seems to be a broad consensus over the many “good things” that trust brings about. That 
explains why the literature on trust is apparently more concerned with the lack or decline of trust than the 
other way [see e.g. Etzioni, 1993; Hetherington, 2005; Norris, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2000]. This 
concern is even more pronounced in case of the new democracies, like those in East Central Europe (ECE) 
where low trust levels towards the political system and institutions are usually associated with problems of 
legitimacy and governance effectiveness [Kornai and Rose-Ackerman, 2004; Rose-Ackerman, 2001b; 
Sztompka, 1999]. After the change of regime in 1989, the German sociologist, Claus Offe cautioned about 
the potential pitfalls of transition. He considered this process as having three dimensions: an economic 
(creating the market economy), a political (creating the institutions of a constitutional democracy) and a 
social (developing common values and norms for cooperation) one, of which the latter was the most difficult 
and time consuming to accomplish. He argued that the burdensome transition process and the 
accompanying economic difficulties could potentially undermine the legitimacy of the infant democratic 
institutions [Offe 1994:15]. 
We assume that the mainstream literature on trust, and more particularly, on institutional trust 
rightly claims that confidence in state institutions is desirable, while low or decreasing trust levels are 
warning signs about the political system’s legitimacy and/or effectiveness problems. It is well known that 
compared to Western Europe, trust levels are lower in ECE. In this paper we focus on institutional trust and 
try to shed some light on its foundations, as well as the possible causes of lower trust levels in ECE. We 
are particularly interested in the micro-level explanations of trust and seek to put under scrutiny an 
                                                          
1  Note that interpersonal trust can be divided into particularized and generalized trust. The former means that one feels 
confidence only towards certain social groups (e.g., family, friends etc.), while the latter implies a generally trustful attitude 
towards strangers, too [Uslaner, 2000]. Forms of particularized trust can be relatively high even in those societies where 
generalized trust is relatively low. 
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argument, which the literature has already posited (and which is implicitly evoked in Offe’s proposition) 
regarding the alleged materialistic attitudes of ECE citizens in terms of trust. We compare data from East 
Central and Western Europe in order to corroborate or reject the hypothesis that in ECE trust is mainly 
associated with levels of welfare. We also raise the question whether in their trust judgements ECE citizens 
are able to evaluate institutions separately or they rather apply a general framework that reflects their 
personal assessment of the political system. 
 
2. Researching Institutional Trust – An Overview 
Finding the roots of institutional trust is one of the primary questions of the field. What is more important in 
determining the level of institutional trust: micro-level factors (such as income, age etc.), macro-level ones 
(political culture, level of economic development etc.) or the (perceived) performance of institutions? We 
start with elaborating on the latter dimension. One may assume that the attributes of institutions influence 
people’s attitudes towards them. For instance, people may trust those institutions more that perform or 
seem to perform well. In this sense, institutional trust can be interpreted as an expectation that the given 
institution will produce positive outcomes [Levi and Stoker 2000; Mishler and Rose 2001]. Several empirical 
findings suggest that perceived institutional performance2 has an effect upon trust. For instance, a general 
observation is that trust in government is more volatile than trust in constitutional courts. Presumably, the 
performance of governments is seen less stable than that of courts. Moreover, people also attribute certain 
social, economic and political problems to the government, which they are less likely to associate with the 
constitutional court [Grosskopf 2008]. However, besides institutional performance and effectiveness, there 
are other factors that may play a role. 
Based on the works of Tom Tyler, a less output-oriented interpretation of institutional trust has also 
gained influence. According to Tyler, institutional trust is an indicator of how respectable or legitimate an 
institution is in the view of the public. This kind of legitimacy, however, involves normative evaluations that 
to a great extent pertain to the fairness of procedures applied by the institutions [Tyler 1990; 2006; 2011]. 
People trust an institution based on perceptions about how it treats them and whether it makes decisions in 
a fair way. Several scholarly works demonstrated that procedural fairness indeed plays a decisive role in 
shaping public trust in institutions and cooperation with them [Gangl 2003; Hawdon 2008; Murphy 2005]. 
Most recently Grönlund and Setälä [2012] showed by analysing European data that institutional trust at the 
individual level depends both on interpersonal trust and on certain normative expectations posed towards 
those institutions: “the more people trust other people and the more honest they find the civil servants of 
their country, the more they trust public institutions” [2012:538]. This is important because it implies that it is 
possible to increase public trust by improving institutional performance, and, more importantly, by improving 
the fairness of procedures that a given institution is applying through its operations. 
So far we have assumed that the individual properties of institutions, like their (perceived) 
effectiveness as well as (perceived) fairness shape people’s trust towards them. Schweer [1997] argues 
that this is indeed the case. Data also show that people, who in some ways are involved in a specific 
institution, are more strongly influenced by their perceptions on institutional performance [Hudson 2006]. 
However, we would exaggerate if we claimed that only these factors influence institutional trust and 
downplayed other general socio-economic, cultural or demographic variables that influence patterns of 
trust. Those variables can work both at the macro and at the micro level.  
                                                          
2 Note that institutional performance is not always easy to evaluate: it is a construct, and an interesting question is that how this 
construct is created by personal experience, public opinion, the media etc.  
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Considering macro-level factors, two of them certainly seem to be relevant. The first one is a general 
culture of trust. Fukuyama [1996] argued that societies can be characterized either as high-trust or low-trust 
cultures and this feature is somehow rooted in history. Those approaches that emphasize the role of 
political culture argue “that institutional trust is exogenous to the political sphere, originating in long-
standing and deeply seeded cultural norms and is an emergent property of interpersonal trust which is 
projected onto political institutions” [Campbell 2004:402]. These approaches hold that institutional trust is 
part of a larger belief-system that influences how and how much people trust each other or impersonal 
organisations. To put it simply, the level of institutional trust is higher in societies where – because of 
specific historical and cultural factors – general social trust is higher [Kunioka and Woller 1999]. Indeed, 
when analysing European Social Survey (ESS) data, we find that there is a remarkably strong association 
(r = 0.96, p < 0.001) between interpersonal trust and institutional trust at the country level (Figure 1).3 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Association between institutional trust and social trust.  
[Source: Authors' calculation from ESS 2010]. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Please consult the Appendix for the operationalization of the variables. 
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Among the old European democracies, the Nordic countries demonstrate the highest aggregate 
levels of trust in both dimensions. This observation also suggests that those scholars who emphasize the 
role of culture in shaping trust may be right in a sense that the general level of trust (both institutional and 
interpersonal) can be interpreted as an attribute of a given society. At the same time, it is also possible that 
another background variable is associated with the two main dimensions of trust. This factor, as suggested 
by Knack and Keefer [1997] or Dearmon and Grear [2011] can also be the level of economic development. 
Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, there is a strong and statistically significant relationship (r = 0.76; p < 0.001) 
between the indicator of economic development and institutional trust even though the deviation from the 
trend line is greater in this case. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  
Association between GDP per capita (2010) and institutional trust (2010). 
[Source: Authors' calculation from ESS 2010 and World Bank data] 
 
 
It is important to note that in the two charts the countries take almost identical positions. It follows 
from this that at the country-level institutional trust, interpersonal trust, and economic development are 
strongly and positively associated with each other. One may thus assume that certain societal attributes 
create a favourable atmosphere for trust that may also facilitate economic development, which, in turn may 
strengthen people’s trust towards each other and in public institutions. 
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However, macro-level factors may not reveal the whole story about the roots and patterns of 
institutional trust. Those scholars, who focus on the individual (or micro-level) variations in institutional trust 
argue that factors such as different experiences of socialization, individual political and economic attitudes 
that people develop to evaluate political institutions are the decisive elements [Rose and Mishler 2011]. In 
particular, the “winner hypothesis”, which assumes that those people show greater trust who are successful 
in social, economic, and political life, has gained prominence recently [Zmerli and Newton 2011]. However, 
due to mixed empirical evidence, a debate has emerged about exactly which micro-level factors matter and 
how in determining institutional trust. 
These debates in the trust literature are relevant for East Central Europe as well, because some 
scholars argue that the micro-level determinants of institutional trust differ in the two sides of Europe. For 
instance, Catterberg and Moreno [2006] argued that in ECE income was a strong predictor of trust in 
political institutions both at the individual and at the country level which was not the case in Western 
Europe. Mishler and Rose [2001] found that unlike in the case of Western Europe, in ECE only age and the 
size of settlement were significant predictors of trust at the individual level: institutional trust increased with 
income and age and on average was higher in smaller towns and settlements. In a more recent study, they 
identified the level of education, age and gender as showing association with institutional trust in ECE: 
more educated people were less likely to trust political institutions, while trust was significantly higher 
among older people and women [Rose and Mishler 2011]. 
In an earlier work, Mishler and Rose [1997] claimed that people in ECE evaluated political 
institutions according to a general frame, which was strongly determined by the economic situation of the 
country they lived in. Moreover, they argued that people in new democracies were not capable of 
distinguishing between specific institutions as they did not make judgements about them on the basis of 
their individual performance or properties. However, Mishler and Rose analysed data from the early 1990s 
and they noted that in the course of democratic development people could have become more aware of the 
differences between political institutions. At the same time, it may also be possible that low levels of 
institutional trust in ECE are not the consequence of the lack of distinction between institutions but because 
citizens are generally distrustful of all institutions in this region as they mostly perceive them as political or 
even corrupt [Marien 2011]. However, if it is true that for one reason or another ECE citizens do not make 
evaluative judgements about separate institutions, then all what was mentioned above on the role of 
institutional performance and procedural fairness in determining trust attitudes would not apply to ECE 
countries. Therefore it is an important issue about which we should gain more insight because it has 
implications for future researches. 
Based on the above discussion, it seems that first, there is a lack of consensus among scholars 
about which factors influence institutional trust. Second, some researchers make a distinction between old 
and newer European democracies in terms of the effects of micro-level foundations on institutional trust. 
This would also suggest that on the two sides of the continent the micro-level factors shape institutional 
trust in different ways. Third, these differences among East and West are supposed to include the different 
ability of people in those regions to form evaluative attitudes on individual institutions – which has a clear 
policy implication about institutional behaviour.  
Our paper aims to contribute to these debates although it does not aspire to build a model that 
comprehensively explains institutional trust including both the exogenous and endogenous variables. 
Instead, we seek to compare the patterns of institutional trust across Eastern and Western Europe, 
especially regarding the role of the micro-level factors. 
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3. Research Questions 
In light of the debates on institutional trust in ECE, we posed the following research questions and 
hypotheses: 
a) Does East Central Europe demonstrate materialistic trust? 
Figure 2 above illustrates that income at the country level is strongly associated with trust across 
Europe. However, we wanted to assess whether the claim of Catterberg and Moreno [2006]  still holds that 
in newer democracies income is a strong predictor of institutional trust also at the individual level. Is it true 
that East Central Europe demonstrates a kind of “materialistic trust” compared to Western Europe? 
(H1) Higher income at the individual level is associated with higher institutional trust. 
(H2) This relationship is stronger in ECE than in Western Europe. 
b) Individual institutions or general patterns of evaluation? 
We wanted to test the thesis of Mishler and Rose [1997] which holds that in new democracies, 
such as in ECE, people are less capable of differentiating between specific institutions. Instead, they use a 
general evaluative pattern when they formulate their attitudes towards institutions. This claim suggests that 
trust indicators of different institutions are strongly associated with each other in ECE. Accordingly, we 
formulated the following hypothesis: 
(H3) Trust in public institutions demonstrates a stronger positive correlation in ECE than in Western 
Europe. 
 
  
4. Data and Variables 
In order to test our assumptions, we used data from the European Social Survey (2010). The 
advantage of using ESS data is that it is one of the most reliable cross-national surveys that offers high-
quality data [Zmerli and Newton 2008] and covers both the older and newer democracies of Europe. To 
measure general institutional trust, we calculated an 11-point indicator, by taking the mean value of the 
valid responses to the question in the ESS databases on trust in the national parliament, in the legal 
system, in the police and in political parties. Similarly, we created an index for social trust by taking the 
mean values of the valid responses to the questions on how much people trust each other, how fair people 
consider their fellow citizens and how helpful they perceive others. 
The use of such indexes, especially regarding the proxy for general institutional trust, has been 
criticized for instance by Fisher et al. [2010] who claim that citizens develop different forms of trust 
judgements that may vary both in application and significance depending on the given institution. However, 
based on Almond and Verba [1963], citizens are likely to develop a single comprehensive attitude towards 
trust in institutions, which is influenced by the political culture prevailing in their country. In a recent study, 
Sofie Marien brings further empirical support for the claim that “institutional trust can be conceptualised as 
a one-dimensional attitude” [2011:19]. 
In order to assess whether these variables of institutional trust and social trust indeed measure the 
relevant background concepts, we ran a principal component analysis (PCA) on the four indicators of 
institutional trust and the three indicators of social trust. The PCA showed that the institutional and social 
trust indicators perform in the same way across all countries.4 They formed two main components: one of 
them contained the indicators of institutional trust while the other one incorporated the three indicators of 
                                                          
4  Countries included from Western Europe: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Countries included from Central Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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social trust. The two main components, depending on the country, explained 58-70 percent of the total 
variance.5  The results of the PCA therefore suggest that it is appropriate to use these variables for 
measuring general institutional and social trust.  
Furthermore, we also calculated Cronbach’s alpha for the indicators used for the two indexes, in 
order to determine the reliability of these variables. In case of the four components of the institutional trust 
index, Cronbach’s alpha ranged between 0.78 and 0.87 for the country samples, which suggests high 
reliability. As for the three components of the social trust index, the scores ranged between 0.60 and 0.85, 
which is also within the acceptable range.6 This exercise also confirms that our indexes of institutional and 
social trust are reliable and measure the relevant concepts. 
 
 
5. Observations at the Micro Level 
Our first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) assume that people in ECE demonstrate even more 
“materialistic” trust than their peers in Western Europe. In order to test this hypothesis with a regression 
model, we had to control for a series of other micro-level factors, which the literature considers to be 
important determinants of institutional trust at the individual level. In our model we used the institutional 
trust index as the dependent variable, while for choosing and specifying the independent variables, we 
followed the study of Zmerli and Newton [2008]. Among the independent variables we included the above 
introduced index of interpersonal trust, and indicators of happiness/satisfaction with life, socializing, media 
consumption, religiosity, and age. We also added dummies for domicile, education, gender, and 
membership in a minority group.7  
In addition, to test the claim that ECE citizens demonstrate more materialistic trust than their peers 
in Western Europe, we also included an income variable from the ESS database, which measures 
household income of the respondents according to the deciles of the actual household income range in the 
given country. Each respondent’s household income is thus assigned to one of the ten national income 
deciles. This variable measures the relative wealth of the household on a 10-point scale, where higher 
values represent higher income deciles.  However, while in the case of the other variables missing data 
were minimal, the income indicator had a lot of missing data points (even up to 30 per cent) in some 
country samples. 
This is problematic, as the high share of missing data may violate the representativeness of the 
country samples, which could lead to biased estimators in the regression model and incorrect inferences. 
For this reason, we applied multiple imputation technique in order to impute the missing income values. 
Multiple imputation is advantageous in that it produces better statistical validity than listwise deletion and is 
also statistically efficient as it uses the entire dataset in the analysis. We ran five iterations using the fully 
conditional specification method to ensure that the imputed data do not fall outside the original ranges. 
Although theoretical concerns have been raised regarding the use of this method, Van Buuren et al. [2006] 
demonstrated that it appears to produce reasonable multiple imputations with appropriate coverage. 
When relatively high number of variables is included into a model, the problem of multicollinearity 
may arise. Although several independent variables in our model correlated with each other, the coefficients 
                                                          
5 The only exception was Switzerland, where besides the two principal components of institutional trust and social trust, a third 
one was also identified from the trust indicators of the parliament, the police and the political parties.  
6 The value of Cronbach’s alpha in case of the three components of the social trust index was slightly below 0.65 only for 
Belgium, France and Spain. 
7 For a full list and operationalization of the variables please consult the Appendix. 
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were small (r <  .3) and also the variance inflation factor was well below the critical threshold (VIF = 2) in 
each case. Based on this we do not consider multicollinearity notably affecting the results. 
In Table 1 we report the pooled parameter estimates of the regression model that we ran on each 
country sample. The relatively low values of adjusted R-squared (between 0.11 and 0.26) suggest that 
much of the variation is left unexplained even though the set of independent variables are quite 
comprehensive in terms of the main socio-demographic factors that may influence institutional trust. This 
suggests that other explanations of trust, either at the macro level or stemming from institutional 
performance, may indeed also be relevant. 
The regression results show some uniform patterns, which are valid across nearly all countries and 
seem to support the “winner” hypothesis about institutional trust – i.e. that different measures of satisfaction 
with life seem to be associated with each other. First, all else being equal, social trust and happiness with 
life is strongly and positively associated with institutional trust. The more socially trusting and happier 
people tend to report higher trust in public institutions. The effect of these two factors is not only significant 
but also sizeable. All else being equal, a one point increase in the social trust index is associated, on 
average, with a minimum increase of 0.15 (Slovakia) and a maximum of 0.45 (Finland) in the institutional 
trust index. Less strong but still notable is the impact of the happiness factor: a one point increase, on 
average, leads to a minimum increase of 0.07 (Norway) and a maximum of 0.23 (Bulgaria) in institutional 
trust. A third, close to uniform and statistically significant pattern is related to religiosity: people who are 
more religious also tend to trust institutions more. A one-point increase in self-reported religiosity, on 
average, is associated with a minimum increase of 0.02 (Netherlands) and a maximum of 0.12 (Hungary) in 
institutional trust.  
The income variable mostly shows the expected positive sign in Western Europe (except for 
Greece and Spain) and is also statistically significant in 8 countries. However, in case of ECE, the results 
are inconclusive as the sign of the relationship between income and institutional trust is either positive or 
negative and in most cases statistically not significant (except for Croatia, where income is negatively 
associated with institutional trust and in Poland, where the relationship is positive). Age also demonstrates 
dissimilarity between the two country groups: while it is negatively (and in most cases, statistically 
significantly) associated with institutional trust in Western Europe, results are mixed for Eastern Europe. 
Namely, in Hungary and Croatia younger people tend to have lower trust in political institutions. 
Interestingly, with few exceptions, neither media consumption nor the variable measuring how socially 
active the respondents are show any significant impact on institutional trust. 
Regarding the dummy variables, the picture is mixed. The education dummies (basic education 
and secondary education) mostly show the expected negative sign, which would imply that people with 
higher education tend to trust institutions more.  However, this effect is not statistically significant across all 
countries thus the results do not allow for drawing a straightforward inference. Nevertheless, there seems 
to be a pattern that people residing in an urban environment in Western Europe tend to have higher trust 
levels in institutions, whereas rather the opposite is the case in Eastern Europe, holding all other variables 
constant. The effects of gender and membership in a minority group on institutional trust suggest that 
country-specific, contextual factors may shape both the direction and the impact of these variables. 
However, to obtain a more nuanced picture of the differences between Eastern and Western 
Europe, we also ran a separate regression on the combined dataset of all the examined countries. In this 
model we included a dummy for East Central Europe and its interaction terms with the independent 
variables. This way it is possible to detect whether the main effects of the predictors differ in the case of 
East Central Europe. For a more straightforward interpretation of the interaction effects and in order to 
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substantially reduce multicollinearity, which arises from the inclusion of the interaction terms, we centred 
the predictors on their mean [see Robinson and Schumacker 2009]. Table 2 summarizes the results. 
 
 Table 2. Pooled parameter estimates of the regression model on the combined dataset (dependent variable: institutional trust)8 
  B SE  t p 
(Intercept) 4.688** 0.020 238.054 0.000 
social trust 0.439** 0.007 62.797 0.000 
happiness 0.198** 0.007 27.078 0.000 
socializing 0.018 0.008 2.250 0.318 
media consumption -0.023* 0.006 -4.000 0.030 
religiosity 0.057** 0.004 14.455 0.000 
income level 0.029** 0.004 6.774 0.000 
age -0.113* 0.027 -4.144 0.027 
city resident1 0.017 0.023 0.715 0.512 
higher education2  0.098** 0.023 4.275 0.000 
male3 0.114** 0.022 5.240 0.000 
minority member4 0.382** 0.057 6.740 0.000 
ECE5 -0.735** 0.035 -20.944 0.000 
income*ECE -0.018 0.008 -2.347 0.186 
age*ECE 0.085 0.050 1.702 0.213 
social trust*ECE -0.131** 0.011 -11.713 0.000 
happiness*ECE -0.027* 0.011 -2.371 0.023 
socializing*ECE -0.091** 0.013 -6.966 0.000 
media consumption*ECE 0.050** 0.010 5.116 0.000 
religiosity*ECE -0.020** 0.007 -2.926 0.004 
city resident*ECE -0.267** 0.041 -6.501 0.000 
higher education*ECE 0.024 0.041 0.597 0.363 
male*ECE -0.136** 0.039 -3.506 0.002 
minority member*ECE -0.297* 0.089 -3.323 0.014 
F-value 856.26   
 N 40705   
adj. R2 0.324   
* Significant at 5 per cent ** Significant at 1 per cent 
Design and population weights applied 
Predictors centered on their mean. Unstandardized coefficients, robust standard errors 
1 reference group: town and village residents 
2 reference group: respondents with basic or secondary education 
3 reference group: female respondents 
4 reference group: non-minority respondents 
5 reference group: Western European respondents 
 
                                                          
8 The estimated parameters were identical for the second, third, fourth and fifth combined imputed dataset. Thus here we report 
the pooled parameter estimates of the first and second imputations. 
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The intercept shows the average value of institutional trust if all variables take their mean (which is 
zero in this specification). The ECE dummy is negative and significant, which suggests that if all conditions 
are the same (all the predictors take their mean value) but the respondent is an ECE citizen, then the 
average level of institutional trust shifts downwards with 0.73 point. This merely reinforces the empirical 
observation that institutional trust, on average, is lower in East Central Europe than in Western Europe. 
As for the main effects, they seem to bring further evidence in support of the winner hypothesis: 
social trust, happiness, income and higher education show a positive and significant effect on institutional 
trust. In addition, religiosity, as expected based on the single country models, is also positively associated 
with the dependent variable, while age and, interestingly, media consumption demonstrates a significant 
negative, albeit weak relationship with institutional trust. Socializing and place of residence, however, does 
not have an effect on the dependent variable. 
The interaction terms reveal whether the effect of the predictors on institutional trust differ in the 
case of East Central Europe.9 Income, age and higher education do not show significant interaction effects, 
which imply that the main effects of these independent variables hold throughout the sample. In other 
words, if the country samples are combined, East Central European citizens do not differ from Western 
Europeans in that their material well-being (Figure 3), age and level of education equally affects individual 
levels of institutional trust. This finding is contrary to the results of Mishler and Rose [2011] and supports 
our first hypothesis on the positive effect of income on institutional trust but refutes the second one, which 
posited that ECE citizens might demonstrate stronger “materialistic” trust than westerners. In this respect, 
we find no difference between Eastern and Western Europe. 
However, the further interpretation of the interaction terms reveals slight differences between the 
two sides of the continent. While social trust, happiness and religiosity remain positively associated with 
institutional trust, their coefficients shift downward in ECE indicating that the effect of these predictors on 
institutional trust is on average somewhat lower in Eastern than in Western Europe. Still, the direction of the 
relationship with institutional trust remains unaffected, which means that also for ECE we find strong 
evidence for the assumption that successful people in life are the more trusting. 
As the interaction terms demonstrate, three variables change their behaviour in ECE (Figure 3). 
First, the effect of gender and minority membership disappears. According to the main effect of the gender 
variable, males trust institutions more than females. However, the interaction term shows that this 
relationship does not hold in East Central Europe where there is no gender effect on institutional trust. 
Similarly, all else being equal, minority members trust institutions more but in ECE this is not the case, 
because minority membership is not associated with trust there. Second, while the main effect of media 
consumption shows a slight negative relationship on institutional trust, this effect is reversed in ECE: more 
media consumption leads to greater institutional trust there. 
In spite of the slight differences, overall, we find that the same socio-demographic factors produce 
similar relationships in both parts of the continent: the results suggest that the winner hypothesis holds 
across ECE and Western Europe as well. In particular, Eastern Europeans do not demonstrate greater 
“materialistic” trust than their western peers. However, several predictors (such as happiness, social trust 
and religiosity) show weaker yet still positive effect on institutional trust in ECE than in Western Europe. 
While we maintain that the effects of micro-foundations on institutional trust are rather similar both in 
Western and Eastern European countries, the causes of the slight differences are yet to be explored in 
future research. 
                                                          
9 We do not interpret significant interaction terms without significant main effects.  
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(c) 
 
 
 
 
(d) 
 
Figure 3. 
Effects of selected variables on institutional trust for East Central and Western Europe.  
(a)Effects of income on institutional trust for Western and Eastern Europe;  
(b) Effects of media consumption on institutional trust for Western and Eastern Europe;  
(c ) Effects of gender on institutional trust for Western and Eastern Europe;  
(d) Effects of minority group membership on institutional trust for Western and Eastern Europe. 
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4. Individual Evaluation of Institutions in Eastern and Western Europe 
According to our third hypothesis (H3), indicators of trust in different political institutions show a stronger 
association with each other in East Central Europe than in Western Europe. In order to test this 
assumption, we calculated bivariate correlation coefficients for five variables that measure trust in different 
institutions in the 2010 ESS database. These indicators were the level of trust in the national parliament, in 
the legal system, in the police, in politicians, and in political parties.  
First, we calculated bivariate correlation coefficients for each possible combination of the above 
variables and for each country. Next, we divided the countries into two groups: Western European 
countries10 and countries of East Central Europe11. Within each country group we looked at the range 
within which the correlation coefficients for every pair of variables vary. In other words, we took the 
minimum and maximum values of the corresponding correlation coefficients for the country groups. 
Figure 4 displays these ranges of the correlation coefficients. The bars in the chart thus show the range in 
which correlation coefficients for each pairwise combination of institutional trust indicators were spread 
within a country group. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  
Range of correlation coefficients between trust in various public institutions in Eastern and Western Europe (2010) 
                                                          
10  Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
11 Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
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Although there is a statistically significant relationship between each pair of institutional trust 
indicators, the chart shows that political institutions (parliament, politicians, and parties) tend to have a 
stronger association with each other than with non-political institutions. In addition, as the range bars 
demonstrate, correlations between institutional trust indicators are slightly stronger in ECE than in WE. 
More importantly, the difference in correlations between ECE and WE is greater in the case of pairs of 
political and non-political institutions than in the case of the purely political pairs. In this respect, the chart 
reveals a notable difference between the two country groups. Based on the position of the range bars, 
bivariate associations between trust in a political (parliament, parties, politicians) and a non-political (legal 
system, police) institution is somewhat stronger in East Central Europe than in Western Europe. This 
observation implies that ECE citizens’ trust judgements about non-political institutions (such as the police 
and the legal system) may be more influenced by political considerations than it is the case in Western 
Europe. While this finding needs to be further explored, which is beyond the scope of this article, based on 
the above empirical evidence ECE citizens do not seem to apply a general evaluative frame towards 
domestic institutions. Although their trust judgements may be more influenced by political considerations 
than that of their Western European peers, they seem to be able to distinguish between separate 
institutions regarding the level of trust they place in them. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
First, in this paper we showed that at the country level there is a strong relationship between economic 
development and institutional and interpersonal trust. This is reflected on the patterns of trust in Europe: 
compared to Western Europe, most of the newer, as well as poorer European democracies score far below 
in institutional and interpersonal trust. These findings suggest that there may be a complex, probably 
circular, self-reinforcing causal mechanism between the level of economic development and the general 
level of interpersonal and institutional trust, although this needs to be further explored. 
Second, we sought to answer the question whether countries of East Central Europe differ from 
Western Europe regarding how micro-level factors affect individuals’ institutional trust. Our results suggest 
that in this respect the two sides of the continent do not substantially differ from each other. Eastern 
Europeans do not demonstrate greater materialistic trust than westerners and the claim that those who are 
successful in life are also more trusting seems to hold in both sides of the continent. Yet, there are certain 
differences between ECE and Western Europe, especially regarding the strength of the effects of the main 
predictors of trust, which calls for further research. 
Third, in this study we demonstrated that compared to western citizens, people in ECE are similarly 
able to differentiate between specific institutions when forming their trusting attitudes towards them. 
Although it may be a popular argument that a specific East Central European political culture is responsible 
for the consistently low or even declining levels of trust in these countries, our results suggest that this 
tendency may also be influenced by other mechanisms that we did not account for in this study. One may 
assume that the attributes and properties of the institutions also shape people’s attitude towards them. For 
instance, it is plausible that people place more trust in those institutions that perform their role well or their 
operation is perceived to be fair. If this holds in ECE, then low levels of institutional trust may be partly 
determined by the mostly negative public perception of institutions. Our findings that trust in non-political 
institutions may be more exposed to political considerations in ECE points in this direction of research. This 
may open a new line of inquiry in the trust literature: besides analyzing the effects of micro and macro level 
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factors, greater emphasis could be devoted to research on institutional performance and on how people 
perceive it when forming trusting attitudes towards specific institutions. 
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APPENDIX. Description of the Variables 
Institutional trust: Mean of the valid responses to the questions concerning trust in the national parliament, legal 
system, police and political parties (0-10) 
Social trust: Mean of the valid responses to the questions on “how much do you trust other people?”, “how fair do you 
think other are?”; and “how helpful do you find others?” (0-10)  
Happiness/satisfaction with life: Mean of the valid responses to the question of “how happy are you?” and “how 
satisfied are you with your life?” (0-10) 
Socializing: How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives, colleagues? (1: never; 7: every day) 
Media consumption: Watching TV on an average weekday (0: no time at all; 7: more than 3 hours) 
Religiosity: How religious are you? (0: not at all; 10: very much) 
Income: The net total income of the respondent’s household classified according to the national income deciles (1 = 
first decile - lowest income); 10 = tenth decile - highest income) 
Age: Natural logarithm of the respondent’s age 
City resident: Dummy (1 = the respondent lives in a big city or in the suburbs or outskirts of a big city) 
Elementary education: Dummy (1 = the respondent has maximum 8 years of completed education) 
Secondary education: Dummy (1 = the respondent has 9-12 years of completed education) 
Higher education: Dummy (1 = the respondent has more than 12 years of completed education) 
Male: Dummy (1 = male respondent) 
Minority member: Dummy (1 = the respondent belongs to a minority group) 
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Table 1. Pooled parameter estimates of the regression model (dependent variable: institutional trust) 
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N 1703 1569 1876 1651 2880 2052 1798 1826 1547 1867 1486 1502 2401 1860 1330 1896 1759 1557 1724 1317 1339 
adj. R-
squared 
0.194 0.192 0.261 0.198 0.238 0.167 0.207 0.257 0.175 0.131 0.208 0.154 0.234 0.156 0.118 0.185 0.218 0.199 0.152 0.114 0.192 
F-value 35.046** 32.095** 56.055** 35.021** 75.838** 35.315** 40.042** 53.518** 28.368** 24.535** 33.552** 23.750** 62.152** 29.706** 15.908** 36.768** 41.971** 33.233** 26.879** 15.225** 27.809** 
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-0.002 
(0.031) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
0.024 
(0.026) 
-0.065 
(0.030) 
0.007 
(0.023) 
0.004 
(0.026) 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
0.016 
(0.027) 
-0.014 
(0.035) 
-0.039 
(0.028) 
-0.028 
(0.031) 
-0.053* 
(-0.021) 
-0.016** 
(0.005) 
0.017 
(0.029) 
0.076 
(0.038) 
0.015 
(0.030) 
0.083* 
(0.030) 
-0.061 
(0.031) 
-0.040 
(0.029) 
0.077* 
(0.033) 
-0.015 
(0.035) 
media 
consumption 
0.003 
(0.022) 
-0.016 
(0.021) 
-0.001 
(-0.011) 
-0.024 
(0.022) 
0.028 
(0.017) 
0.092** 
(0.020)  
-0.013 
(0.020) 
-0.033 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.022) 
-0.009 
(0.021) 
-0.011 
(-0.014) 
0.009 
(0.019) 
0.032 
(0.027) 
0.007 
(0.027) 
-0.018 
(0.023) 
-0.010 
(0.023) 
0.079** 
(0.024) 
0.034 
(0.020) 
0.089** 
(0.026) 
0.030 
(0.024) 
religiosity 
0.080** 
(0.014) 
0.052** 
(0.016) 
0.091** 
(0.013) 
0.086** 
(0.015) 
0.078** 
(0.011) 
0.064** 
(0.019) 
0.106** 
(0.017) 
0.025* 
(0.011) 
0.056** 
(0.015) 
0.100** 
(0.016) 
0.034* 
(0.014) 
0.054** 
(0.016) 
0.092** 
(0.013) 
0.047* 
(0.019) 
0.114** 
(0.022) 
0.075** 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
0.125** 
(0.017) 
0.056** 
(0.018) 
0.058** 
(0.017) 
0.031 
(0.018) 
income 
0.056** 
(0.018) 
0.028 
(0.014) 
0.045** 
(0.013) 
0.029 
(0.017) 
0.046** 
(0.013) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
0.093** 
(0.018) 
0.071** 
(0.014) 
0.043* 
(0.014) 
-0.026 
(0.017) 
0.032* 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.050** 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.017) 
-0.065* 
(0.026) 
-0.024 
(0.019) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
0.066** 
(0.017) 
0.019 
(0.022) 
0.030 
(0.022) 
age 
-0.436** 
(0.093) 
-0.414** 
(0.099) 
-0.303** 
(-0.053) 
-0.182 
(0.115) 
-0.473** 
(0.081) 
0.673** 
(0.117) 
-0.222 
(0.099) 
-0.106 
(0.091) 
-0.331** 
(0.099) 
-0.144 
(0.110) 
-0.200 
(0.092) 
-0.524** 
(-0.064) 
-0.279** 
(0.019) 
0.071 
(0.137) 
0.353* 
(0.138) 
-0.033 
(0.114) 
0.162 
(0.112) 
0.306* 
(0.129) 
-0.035 
(0.112) 
-0.287* 
(0.129) 
-0.196 
(0.129) 
city resident 
0.186 
(0.089) 
0.111 
(0.076) 
0.164* 
(0.071) 
0.258* 
(0.093) 
0.001 
(0.075) 
0.090 
(0.082) 
0.127 
(0.079) 
0.122 
(0.071) 
0.380** 
(0.078) 
-0.001 
(0.087) 
0.113 
(0.076) 
0.095 
(0.103) 
-0.087** 
(0.016) 
-0.323** 
(0.097) 
-0.378** 
(0.113) 
0.173 
(0.086) 
-0.151 
(0.097) 
-0.245* 
(0.102) 
-0.031 
(0.090) 
-0.551** 
(0.118) 
0.155 
(0.105) 
elementary 
education 
-0.430* 
(0.145) 
-0.373** 
(0.114) 
-0.020 
(0.114) 
0.085 
(0.133) 
0.271 
(0.145) 
0.194 
(0.129) 
0.065 
(0.186) 
-0.279* 
(0.127) 
-0.077 
(0.185) 
-0.040 
(0.121) 
-0.052 
(0.139) 
0.224 
(0.164) 
0.438 
(0.220) 
-0.050 
(0.152) 
-0.070 
(0.184) 
0.215 
(0.275) 
0.007 
(0.173) 
-0.140 
(0.161) 
0.125 
(0.155) 
-0.427 
(0.278) 
-0.176 
(0.148) 
 
 
 
 
 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
 
Page 3 
Zsolt Boda, Gergö  Medve-Bálint: “Does Institutional Trust  in East Central Europe Differ from Western Europe?” 
 
EQPAM Volume 3 No.2 April  2014  
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN-L 2285 - 4916   
secondary 
education 
-0.118 
(0.087) 
-0.066 
(0.087) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.093) 
-0.112 
(0.065) 
0.161 
(0.098) 
0.034 
(0.093) 
-0.235** 
(0.073) 
-0.166 
(0.084) 
-0.363** 
(0.102) 
-0.251** 
(0.082) 
-0.198 
(-0.056) 
-0.306** 
(0.016) 
-0.100 
(0.109) 
-0.142 
(0.128) 
0.097 
(0.085) 
-0.037 
(0.092) 
-0.171 
(0.108) 
-0.065 
(0.092) 
0.038 
(0.103) 
-0.200 
(0.111) 
male 
0.112 
(0.078) 
0.285** 
(0.073) 
0.227** 
(0.069) 
-0.070 
(0.083) 
0.183* 
(0.061) 
0.026 
(0.082) 
0.325 
(0.077) 
0.203** 
(0.066) 
0.275** 
(0.077) 
-0.034 
(0.079) 
0.127 
(0.075) 
-0.009 
(-0.049) 
0.061 
(0.072) 
0.042 
(0.094) 
0.366** 
(0.108) 
-0.028 
(0.082) 
0.053 
(0.089) 
-0.079 
(0.098) 
-0.038 
(0.085) 
-0.268** 
(0.100) 
0.095 
(0.096) 
minority 
member 
-0.013 
(0.251) 
-0.173 
(0.296) 
-0.054 
(-0.173) 
-0.014 
(0.231) 
0.600** 
(0.166) 
0.518* 
(0.082) 
0.776 
(0.160) 
-0.136 
(0.178) 
0.392 
(0.206) 
0.292 
(0.284) 
-0.189 
(0.264) 
0.527* 
(0.178) 
0.468** 
(0.153) 
0.624** 
(0.152) 
0.332 
(0.244) 
-0.224 
(0.251) 
-0.311 
(0.147) 
-0.006 
(0.250) 
-0.653 
(0.450) 
0.138 
(0.244) 
-0.098 
(0.294) 
Unstandardized coefficients, robust standard errors. Design weight applied. 
* Significant at 5 %  **Significant at 1  
